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I. Introduction
The macroeconomic e¤ects of aid ‡ows have been the subject of an extensive and ongoing debate in both policy and academic circles. Many have argued that, despite the external …nancing constraints these ‡ows help alleviate-and the public infrastructure they can help pay for-aid surges can hurt growth by inducing real exchange rate appreciation pressures, to the detriment of growth-promoting exporting industries. 1 In practice, these concerns have triggered policy responses that have in ‡uenced the actual e¤ects of aid. In a canonical aid transaction, the foreign exchange (FX) accrues to the government, which sells it to the central bank in exchange for a local currency deposit, which is then drawn down as the government spends the aid. With a managed ‡oat, the central bank in turn decides whether to use the FX to accumulate foreign reserves, and if so whether such accumulation should be sterilized. Berg et al. (2007) document how, during aid surge episodes in several African countries with managed ‡oats (Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda), concerns about real appreciation resulted in large accumulations of reserves. This policy response may have helped contain the appreciation pressures. But it also resulted in a peculiar situation in which the aid was used twice: once to increase government spending, and once to increase the stock of reserves. The private sector was crowded out as a result, mainly through higher interest rates (when the accumulation was sterilized) and in some cases also through the in ‡ation tax (when otherwise).
The crucial role of the central bank in the macroeconomics of aid has received little attention in the academic literature until recently. 2 Indeed, most previous work on the topic is built on the standard treatment of the transfer problem, which assumes that, to the extent the aid is being fully spent, it must also result in higher domestic absorption (an increase in the current account de…cit net of aid), and by extension that aid cannot be both spent and saved as international reserves at the same time. 3 While this assumption would be viable if the public sector-the direct recipient of the aid-was a single entity, it no longer holds once it is acknowledged that the public sector consists of two separate institutions: the government and the central bank. This duality makes the distinction between spending and absorbing the aid crucial. While the former is determined by …scal policy, the latter is in ‡uenced by the reserve policy of the central bank, especially when capital mobility is limited. In practice there is no institutional arrangement that ensures coordination between the two policies, thus allowing for the spending without absorbing policy mix described above. 4 In previous work, Berg et al. (2010a Berg et al. ( , 2010b have used this typology to model the e¤ects of aid surges-episodes of large and persistent yet temporary increases in aid-under managed ‡oats, in both the short and medium term. Berg et al. (2010a) developed a tractable new-Keynesian model with traded and non-traded goods to study short-run e¤ects. Unlike the predictions of the standard transfer problem analysis, these authors showed that a policy of spending but not absorbing the aid can result in both a real and nominal depreciation if the resulting demand pressures, due to the …scal expansion, are strong enough to threaten external balance. This can be the case even if the accumulation of reserves is fully sterilized (their default assumption in managed ‡oats). Berg et al. (2010b) extended the model to allow for endogenous capital accumulation, production externalities in the export sector and possible ine¢ ciencies in the conversion of public investment into public capital. When aid is both spent and absorbed, the model predicted a sizeable nominal and real appreciation, sectoral reallocations between the traded and the non-traded sector, and a crowding-in of private investment due to the positive e¤ects of higher infrastructure on the returns to private capital. Instead, when aid is spent but not absorbed, the policy mix can have negative medium-term e¤ects on growth and on welfare because of the crowding out of private investment. 5 In this paper, we both extend and simplify the model in Berg et al. (2010b) to study the role of the exchange rate regime, and the resulting policy options central banks have at their disposal, in shaping the e¤ects of aid surges. We answer a number of questions. First, are the macroeconomic e¤ects of aid di¤erent in …xed versus ‡exible (managed ‡oats) regimes? Second, what impact do sterilization policies (in pegs) have on aid absorption? Third, what are the welfare implications of alternative policy responses, under either ‡exible or …xed exchange rates?
Understanding the role of the exchange rate regime in the macroeconomics of aid is, in our opinion, of …rst-order importance. First, sub-Saharan Africa is evenly divided between pegs and managed ‡oats: 23 of the 44 countries covered by the African department of the IMF have a de jure …xed exchange rate regime, while the rest have some type of managed ‡oat (see Berg and Portillo, 2008) . Second, the importance of aid for both …scal and balance of payment support cuts across exchange rate regimes, and concerns with the e¤ects of aid are as pervasive in countries with managed ‡oats, e.g., as discussed in Berg et al. (2007) , as in hard pegs, e.g., the CFA zone, as documented by Ouattara and Strobl (2008) . To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper that provides a systematic treatment of the exchange rate regime in the macroeconomics of aid from a spending/absorption perspective.
In principle, the ability to in ‡uence aid absorption in pegs is limited because the central bank does not have control over its reserve accumulation. In practice, limited capital mobility (a pervasive feature of low-income countries) provides an additional degree of freedom, which is embodied in the central bank's ability to sterilize (or not) any reserve accumulation that follows from the defense of the peg. Assuming that the government spends the aid as it accrues, we study two stylized responses by the central bank: sterilizing or not sterilizing the endogenous accumulation of reserves. For ‡exible (managed) regimes, on the other hand, we assume the central bank can accumulate aid as reserves and study the macroeconomic consequences of doing so.
Our …ndings are the following, based on a calibration of the model to a representative sub-Saharan African country:
First, a policy of limited or no sterilization allows for almost (but slightly less than) full absorption of the aid surge and sizeable real appreciation. This is the aid analog of the specie- ‡ow mechanism that dates back to Hume. The initial increase in liquidity that results from spending the aid domestically fuels aggregate demand, in ‡ation and imports, which are then …nanced with the aid-related FX. The end result is similar to the case of no reserve accumulation in a managed ‡oat. Just like in the managed ‡oat, the economy experiences a real appreciation and an increase in private consumption, investment, and output. Unlike the managed ‡oat, the real appreciation is achieved via an increase in in ‡ation, which can only come about through higher aggregate demand pressures in the short run. The increase in in ‡ation also requires some accumulation of reserves to help accommodate the increase in demand for nominal money balances, which explains why absorption is less than complete.
Second, a policy of complete sterilization in a peg can greatly limit in ‡ation and the real appreciation but at the cost of limiting absorption and crowding out the private sector, similar to a policy of deliberately accumulating aid in reserves in a ‡oat. Out of concern for the increase in in ‡ation, either because it signals aggregate demand pressures or because it amounts to a real appreciation and therefore a potential loss of competitiveness, the central bank may decide to engage in open market operations that limit the initial increase in liquidity. By doing so, the central bank is raising real interest rates and forcing the private sector to reduce its spending, which then limits the demand for imports and helps support the accumulation of reserves. The end result is less in ‡ation and a less appreciated real exchange rate, but at the cost of crowding out private investment and a¤ecting output in the medium term.
Third, like in the managed ‡oat case, the ability to in ‡uence absorption and the real exchange rate is reduced in a …xed regime as international capital mobility increases. This is a well-known result, which is often restated more generally as the inability of the central bank to control short-run in ‡ation in a peg when the capital account is perfectly open. One surprising result from our model is that, even without restrictive monetary policy, the positive e¤ects of aid on private consumption, private investment, and real output can disappear once international capital mobility increases significantly. The reason is that the open capital account activates the uncovered interest parity condition, generating a strong link between domestic real interest rates and expected real depreciation. As the real exchange rate overshoots in the short-run relative to its future value-because the aid surge is temporary-the expected future depreciation acts as a drag on private consumption and investment and increases capital out ‡ows. While we do not wish to overemphasize this result, since it is sensitive to the speci…c calibration we use, it indicates the real possibility of capital ‡ight in response to the aid surge. 6 In sum, much of the drama that is present in response to aid surges in managed ‡oats is equally present under …xed exchange rate regimes, with the additional complication that higher in ‡ation is necessary for the aid to be absorbed. Because there are potential trade-o¤s between in ‡ation (under no sterilization) and private sector crowding out (under full sterilization) in a peg, we therefore undertake a welfare analysis as a selection criterion for sterilization policies under a …xed and for reserve accumulation policies in managed ‡oats.
The welfare analysis yields a number of interesting …ndings. First, in our model, policies that encourage aid absorption are welfare dominant, regardless of the exchange rate regime: it is preferable to allow the country as a whole to use the aid-related FX, rather than having it sit in an account in New York. For this reason, in the case of a peg, a policy of no sterilization largely dominates a policy of complete sterilization, while in the case of a managed ‡oat, a policy of no reserve accumulation dominates a policy of full reserve accumulation. Second, policies that result in aid absorption have similar welfare e¤ects under pegs and ‡exible exchange rates, although ‡exible exchange rates regime are slightly superior. This is because ‡exible exchange rate regimes can absorb aid with a much smaller aggregate demand boom than pegs, which instead need the boom-the increase in in ‡ation-for aid absorption. At the other end of the spectrum, policies that result in limited aid absorption have larger negative e¤ects on welfare in pegs than in managed ‡oats, mainly because they have larger e¤ects on private investment. Third, for pegs, only when the degree of sterilization reaches a high enough share of the reserve accumulation does this policy limit the degree of aid absorption and, therefore, results in a signi…cant reduction in welfare. This suggests that what matters for aid absorption under a peg is that there is some monetary policy expansion-in order to encourage the private sector to increase its demand for imports.
Previous works in the aid literature have explored some of the policy issues we discuss in this paper. Adam et al. (2009) and Bu¢ e et al. (2004 Bu¢ e et al. ( , 2008 Bu¢ e et al. ( , 2010 have extensively analyzed the role of monetary policy and exchange rate regimes in the context of aid surges. However, they have done so in models with currency substitution and …scal dominance, which con ‡ate the direct impact of aid with passive changes in monetary policy and currency-demand induced capital ‡ows. Unlike our paper, these authors do …nd bene…ts to reserve accumulation following an aid surge. The main di¤erence between our paper and theirs is twofold. First, we treat the central bank as an independent institution, which raises policy coordination issues with the government. In their setup the central bank does not have complete control over in ‡ation, because of existing …scal dominance, which then interacts with changes in the demand for currency (domestic and foreign) in ways that amplify the short-run e¤ects of the surge and, therefore, justi…es accumulating reserves in order to undo some of the capital in ‡ow. While monetary …nancing of the de…cit is sometimes an important issue in monetary policy in lowincome countries, it is not necessary for the macroeconomics of aid ‡ows. Second, we allow for private and public capital accumulation, which raises the (real) output costs of reserve accumulation and sterilization policies.
Another strand of the literature, including Adam and Bevan (2006) , Agénor et al. (2008) , Agénor and Yilmaz (2013) , Arellano et al. (2009 ), Cerra et al. (2009 ), and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007 , among others, explores the macroeconomic e¤ects of aid in the context of real growth models. But these works abstract from central bank policy and therefore are not suitable to discuss …scal/reserve policy interactions and their real e¤ects, as our modeling approach allows. Furthermore, our work is also related to an older literature on "counterpart funds", the local currency proceeds from the sale within the aid-recipient country of in-kind transfers such as food aid (see Khatkhate, 1963 , Roemer, 1988 , in this journal, among others). While these papers had identi…ed some of the mechanisms we discuss here, they lack a coherent modeling framework to make sense of the policy responses.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the structure of the model.
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Section III discusses the calibration of the model. Section IV presents and elaborates on the results of the policy experiments under a …xed exchange rate regime and a managed ‡oat. Finally, section V concludes.
II. The Model
Our framework is a simpli…ed version of the model presented in Berg et al. (2010b) . It consists of a standard two-sector new-Keynesian model of a small open economy enriched with policy reaction functions that determine the degree of exchange rate commitment, international reserve accumulation, and sterilization. 7 The country produces a non-traded good y N t and a traded good y T t using private capital k, labor l, and government-supplied infrastructure q. Households may hold both domestic and foreign assets, but the latter are subject to portfolio adjustment costs. These costs capture the degree of international capital mobility, and their calibration allows to study a range of options, from de facto closed to a fully open capital account.
We separate policy decisions: the central bank is in charge of exchange rate and monetary policy (including international reserves accumulation and open-market operations), while the …scal authority, which is the direct recipient of aid, decides how much of this aid to spend. All quantity variables except labor are de-trended by the labor productivity level, which grows at a constant factor n-the exogenous long-run gross growth rate of the economy.
We assume that the law of one price holds for the traded good. Therefore P T t = S t P T t ; where P T t is the price of traded goods, S t corresponds to the nominal exchange rate, and P T t is the foreign price of traded goods. By denoting the domestic (foreign) Consumer Price Index (CPI) as P t (P t ), we can express the CPI-based real exchange rate as s t =
StP t
Pt and the relative price of non-traded goods as
We also de…ne real gross domestic product (GDP) as: y t = p N y N t + sy T t , i.e., the sum of the production of the non-traded good, y N t , and the traded good, y T t , valued at their steady-state relative prices p N and s.
We proceed to lay out the model in stages, starting with the production side.
A. Firms in the Traded (T) and Non-traded (N) Good Sectors
In each sector j = T; N , the representative …rm i produces goods with a technology that combines labor (l j it ), …rm-speci…c private capital (k j it 1 ), and public capital (q t 1 ), according to
where z j is a constant productivity parameter, indicates the production share of labor, and denotes the share of private capital in total capital used in production. Private capital is accumulated via investment x j it but is subject to depreciation and adjustment costs, as described by
where is the depreciation rate and F j it 2
are adjustment costs as in Christiano et al. (2005) .
Firms in the traded sector face perfect competition and ‡exible prices, while …rms in the nontraded sector face monopolistic competition and sticky prices. Each monopolist in the non-traded sector (j = N ) produces a variety i of the non-traded good and is subject to a demand constraint of the Dixit-Stiglitz type with measuring the elasticity of substitution of these varieties. Moreover, as in Rotemberg (1982) , the monopolist faces price adjustment costs capturing price stickiness, where the parameter quanti…es the degree of this stickiness.
Firms in both sectors are pro…t-maximizers. They choose the amount of labor, private capital, and investment (and the price p N it in the case of …rms in the non-traded sector) that maximize the discounted pro…ts. In each sector, there is also a tax distortion $ that reduces the value of …rms' sales, capturing a broad set of institutional features that keep poor countries from investing at the high rates that might otherwise be justi…ed by the very low stocks of private capital. In this way, we match the observed low investment shares in low-income countries.
B. Households
m t are the holdings of real money balances, and l t is the amount of labor supplied to …rms. The parameter 2 (0; 1) corresponds to the subjective discount factor, # 2 (0; 1) is the share of consumption in utility; > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between c t and m t , { is a scale parameter, and > 0 is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
Labor mobility is limited across sectors and intersectoral wage di¤erentials are possible. Supplied labor is then de…ned as in Bouakez et al. (2009) by a CES aggregator with d measuring the share of labor supplied to the non-traded sector, l N t , in total employment, and % corresponding to the elasticity of substitution between labor services provided to the two sectors.
The budget constraint of the representative agent, de ‡ated by the domestic CPI and normalized by the economy's growth rate, is given by:
where b c t is the consumer's real holdings of domestic bonds issued by the government, which pay a gross nominal interest rate i t and b t denotes his real holdings of foreign assets that pay i t and are subject to portfolio adjustment costs P t . Moreover, w t l t is total labor income, t = Pt P t 1 denotes gross domestic in ‡ation, while is foreign in ‡ation; which is assumed to be constant. t denotes real pro…ts from domestic …rms and is an income tax rate set by the government.
The portfolio adjustment costs are given by P t 2 (b t b ) 2 ; where b is the steady-state value of real foreign assets. These costs serve two purposes. First, they ensure stationarity of b t . 9 Second, they allow us to model limited international capital mobility. When ! +1; the capital account is practically closed; whereas when 0 < << 1; it is partially open.
The problem of the representative consumer reduces to maximizing (31) with respect to consumption, real money balances, labor supply in both sectors, and domestic and foreign assets, subject to the constraint (35) and a transversality condition associated with all asset holdings.
C. The Government C.1. Fiscal Policy
The government is the direct recipient of foreign aid A t ; which follows the process
where A is the steady state level of aid, A t corresponds to an exogenous increase in aid at time t, and A 2 (0; 1) is the degree of persistence of the increase in aid.
Government consumption g t is a CES basket similar to that of the households, but with and re ‡ecting the weight on non-traded goods and the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods, respectively, and with an associated relative price index p g t :
The government is subject to a period-by-period budget constraint (in real terms) of the type
The government can …nance its spending p g t g t by taxing labor income w t l t , using the domestic currency value of aid proceeds, or issuing domestic debt net of amortization. It must however pay interest on the share of government debt held by the private sector (b c t ). We assume the stock of total government debt (b t ) is constant and is held by either the private sector or by the central bank (b cb t ), with their relative shares varying through open market operations by the central bank. 10 
The previous budget constraint implies that spending will always adjust to satisfy the constraint (44). In addition, spending can be used for public consumption or investment purposes. For simplicity, public investment is a constant share of government spending, i.e., x g t = g t with 2 [0; 1]: It serves to accumulate public capital q t following
where g is the depreciation rate of public capital.
D. The Central Bank
We are interested in the implications of di¤erent exchange rate regimes for the macroeconomic e¤ects of aid surges. We will …rst consider the case of a ‡exible exchange rate regime and use it as a benchmark to understand the e¤ects of having a …xed regime. Then, under a …xed regime, we will analyze the macroeconomic consequences of di¤erent sterilization policies, and we will compare them with the outcomes of managed ‡oats.
To organize the discussion, it is helpful to start with the central bank balance sheet in …rst (real) di¤erences:
That is, real changes in money supply, m t m t 1 n t
; depend on open-market operations, b cb t b cb t n t ; and changes in international reserves,
We proceed to describe how the components of this equation are determined. Note that, although the central bank accumulates reserves, the public sector does not derive any revenue from accumulating these assets. In particular, reserves do not enter the government's budget constraint directly. This re ‡ects our assumption that reserves do not earn any interest.
D.1. Exchange Rate Regimes and Reserve Accumulation Policies
We capture di¤erent speci…cations of exchange regimes (managed ‡oat versus …xed) by assuming that the central bank implements the following rule for the accumulation of international reserves:
where S t is the nominal depreciation of the currency, and R and S are the steady-state levels (targets) of reserves and nominal depreciation. The parameter ! s 0 measures the degree of commitment to a nominal depreciation target. For ! s = 0; the rule replicates a ‡exible exchange rate regime, while for ! s >> 0; the rule captures a …xed regime. Under a ‡exible exchange rate regime, the central bank can still accumulate reserves in response to changes in the volume of aid. In this case the regime becomes a managed ‡oat. The coe¢ cient ! 2 [0; 1] measures the fraction of additional aid dollars sold on the market to the private sector by the central bank, i.e., the degree of absorption of aid by the private sector. Under a …xed regime, on the other hand, reserves accumulation is driven by the central bank's commitment to hitting the targeted nominal depreciation S . 11 This, of course, implies that aid absorption by the private sector, under a …xed regime, becomes endogenously determined, as we discuss below.
D.2. Monetary and Sterilization Policies
We allow for two alternative money growth rules: either full or zero sterilization. To model full sterilization, we assume that open-market operations (changes in b cb t ) adjust such that nominal reserve money always grows at the rate g-i.e.,
This captures the fact that many low-income countries still target money, at least de jure. More speci…cally, full sterilization requires that open-market operations follow:
Then if aid is accumulated in international reserves, either in the case of a ‡exible exchange rate regime or under a …xed regime, open-market operations would increase-the stock of government debt held by the central bank would decrease-in order to fully sterilize the direct monetary injection that would follow from higher aid in ‡ows.
In the alternative speci…cation, central bank purchases of nominal government bonds grow at constant rate g;:
At steady state, this process ensures that nominal money supply grows at the gross rate g, which pins down the steady-state level of in ‡ation, just like in the previous speci…cation. Outside of the steady state, however, this rule does not ensure a constant growth rate for nominal money. In this case, the money growth rate will increase when aid is accumulated as international reserves.
E. The Balance of Payments
We conclude our presentation of the model with the balance of payments:
where x aT t corresponds to the traded components of the investments in the traded and non-traded sectors, respectively. Equation (53) makes clear the possible uses of aid: it can …nance a higher current account de…cit net of aid (CAD), a capital account surplus (KAS), or an accumulation of reserves (RA).
III. Calibration
Our analysis will rely on numerical simulations. 12 To impose discipline, we calibrate most of the parameters of the model to a representative low-income country. As in Berg et al. (2010b) , we replicate the Ugandan economy for the period 2008-2009, and assume that the unit of time in the model is a quarter. Uganda captures important features of sub-Saharan African economies: low investment in infrastructure, sizeable dependence on aid with large and persistent shocks to aid ‡ows, low tax revenue as a percent of GDP, among other features. And although Uganda follows a ‡exible exchange rate regime, we use it as a baseline for at least two reasons. First, the ‡exible regime case provides a benchmark to understand the implications of …xing the exchange rate, as our comparative analysis will show below. Second, this baseline of a ‡exible regime, together with no reserve accumulation, is an optimal benchmark as it maximizes welfare in our analysis -i.e., it shows the highest positive impact of aid on consumption relative to which other policy scenarios can be considered.
We organize the calibration discussion around two groups of parameters that help pin down (i) technologies and preferences and (ii) policies (see Tables 1 and 2) . We now brie ‡y discuss the calibration of some of these parameters, particularly those for which we do not use Ugandan speci…c data or we do not normalize.
For the technology parameter ; which determines the impact of public capital on growth, we pick values such that the annual return to public investment is about 20 percent. Estimates of this return vary signi…cantly across empirical studies. However, the weight of the evidence in both micro and macro studies points to a high average return. Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) estimate returns for electricity, water and sanitation, irrigation, and roads range from 17 percent to 24 percent: Similarly, the macro-based estimates in Dalgaard and Hansen (2005) cluster between 15 percent and 30 percent for a wide array of di¤erent estimators. The investment adjustment cost parameter ( ) ensures smooth impulse responses for investment, whereas the depreciation rates ( ) are in line with Bu (2004) calculations. The price adjustment cost parameter ( ) implies price stickiness for almost a year, while the elasticity of substitution between non-traded varieties ( ) matches a standard value for markups in the literature of 10 percent. z N =z T
1.06
The ratio of the productivity parameters in the productive sectors ensures the real exchange rate equals 1 at steady state 0.015
The private capital depreciation rates (Bu, 2004) 47
The price adjustment cost parameter implies prices are sticky for almost one year (standard value in the literature)
The distribution parameter for consumption of non-traded goods is consistent with Uganda National Income Accounts 0.89 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution between non-traded and traded goods in Uganda (Tokarick, 2009) 
12
The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution between varieties matches a markup of 10 percent (standard value in the literature)
The disutility of labor parameter normalizes households employment to one at steady state 2.5
The inverse of the Frisch elasticity (standard value in the literature)
The share of consumption in utility function helps match Uganda's real money balances in percent of GDP (6 percent) 0.180 The real money balances to nominal interest rate semi-elasticity is based on a regression using Uganda's data
The distribution labor parameter matches the Ugandan share of non-traded production in value added (60 percent)
The labor services elasticity of substitution (Horvath, 2000) 0.995
The discount factor helps match interest rates in Uganda 1000
The portfolio adjustment costs parameter
The private external debt in the long run is normalized to zero
With respect to the elasticity of substitution between hours worked in the two sectors %, we set it to 1, which corresponds to the econometric estimates provided by Horvath (2000) . Assuming very large values for %-perfect labor substitution-does not a¤ect the qualitative results. Similarly, following the macro-labor literature we set the inverse of the Frisch elasticity equal to 2:5: We assume that the economy has a closed capital account, which makes sterilization policies quite e¤ective. While somewhat extreme, this assumption is supported by measures of de jure restrictions on cross-border …nancial transactions in Schindler (2009) : on an index that ranges between zero and one, where zero corresponds to perfectly open capital and one corresponds to perfectly closed, the value for the median sub-Saharan African country is 0.76. For comparison, the value for the median OECD country is 0.04. Consequently, we choose a very high value for the portfolio adjustment costs parameter ( = 1000). We model a temporary but persistent increase in aid such that, as a result of the scaling up, aid is on average six percentage points of GDP higher than its steady-state value over the following …ve years. Note that the coe¢ cient A in the process for aid described in (42) results in a half life of the shock of slightly more than a year, which implies the aid increase is front loaded. This stylized path helps us bring out the macroeconomic dynamic responses in a clearer way.
The values of the parameters of the central bank represent the policy experiments that we will study below. We will compare the implications of ‡exible versus …xed exchange rate regimes. To do so, we set ! s = 0 and ! s = 5000 in the rule (48), respectively. When studying ‡exible exchange rates, we will allow the central bank to accumulate aid in international reserves. When ! = 1 in (48), the central bank does not accumulate aid in reserves-i.e., full aid absorption. While if ! = 0 then the central bank accumulates all aid in reserves-i.e., no aid absorption-with a signi…cant persistence in the accumulation process ( R = 0:95). In the case of pegs, we will focus on either full or no sterilization, as described by (50) or (51), respectively. Below we will also show how we can also write a more general rule that nests these two options as extreme cases in a continuum.
IV. Simulation Results
A. A Flexible Exchange Rate Regime Versus A Fixed Regime: Are They Similar?
To …x ideas, we start by comparing the case of a ‡exible exchange rate regime (! s = 0) and no accumulation of aid in international reserves (! = 1) with the case of a …xed exchange rate regime (! s = 5000) and no sterilization. The results of the simulations are presented in Figure 1 , where the annualized impulse responses of selected macroeconomic variables are measured as percentage deviations from steady state, unless otherwise noted.
Focusing on the ‡exible regime case …rst (see solid line in Figure 1) , we see that government spending of aid drives the short-run macroeconomic e¤ects of the aid surge. Overall government spending increases by a similar magnitude than the increase in aid. Nominal price rigidities imply that the supply of non-traded goods greatly expands in response to greater demand generating a shortlived spike in real GDP. This expansion in non-traded output is partly accomplished through higher labor demand, which contributes to the rapid increase in real wages in the short run (not shown) and translates into higher non-traded good in ‡ation. This, however, does not induce higher CPI in ‡ation. The in ‡ow of aid-related FX results in a nominal appreciation, which causes traded good de ‡ation but more importantly triggers expenditure switching in the private sector and therefore helps reduce aggregate demand pressures somewhat. In the simulations, this de ‡ation more than o¤sets the increase in non-traded good in ‡ation and, as a result, CPI in ‡ation declines in the …rst years. This and the neutral policy stance by the central bank lead to a slight decrease in nominal interest rates. Over time, as nominal rigidities dissipate, the demand-driven boom fades away. However, since part of the government spending has been used to increase public investment, the public capital stock accumulates, causing a persistent and positive e¤ect on GDP that accounts for most of the output increase in the medium term. This process is reinforced by higher private investment, which increases in response to the positive e¤ect that higher public capital has on the marginal product of private capital. 
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The central bank's policy of no reserve accumulation allows for a real exchange rate appreciation and leads to a full absorption of aid by the private sector. That is, as the real exchange rate appreciates, imports (consumption and investment of traded goods) increase and traded output declines (not shown), resulting in a widening of the trade de…cit. This is made possible by the central bank's policy of selling all the foreign currency counterpart of aid to the private sector. In the end, the increase of the trade de…cit is almost as big as the aid surge.
We now compare these results with the case of a …xed exchange rate regime (! s = 5000), where the central bank does not sterilize the excess of money liquidity induced by any endogenous accumulation of reserves (see solid line with dots in Figure 1 ). Absent sterilization, a …xed exchange rate regime delivers similar real exchange rate appreciation dynamics to those present under a ‡exible regime. However, the mechanism that drives this appreciation is di¤erent. Under a …xed exchange rate, traded good prices remain constant, so non-traded good in ‡ation has to increase signi…cantly more to bring about the same relative price change. But this also means substantially higher overall in ‡ation, because unlike the ‡exible regime case, there is no traded-good de ‡ation. Higher non-traded good in ‡ation is caused by larger demand pressures in the non-traded sector (again, because of public consumption of non-traded goods), as re ‡ected by a more pronounced short-run spike in GDP, relative to the one in the ‡exible regime scenario. Over the medium term, however, output responses are practically identical.
With a …xed regime, the accumulation of international reserves is not a policy choice; instead, it is endogenously governed by the need to sell as much foreign exchange as needed to achieve the rate of crawl. In contrast to the ‡exible exchange rate scenario, where all of the aid in ‡ows are sold, a small fraction of these in ‡ows are accumulated as reserves. Without sterilization, and provided the domestic currency counterpart is fully spent by the government, the reserve accumulation associated with the …xed regime is associated with an expansion of the money supply. 13 The real interest rate increases to help keep in ‡ation expectations anchored, but this increase is moderate (relative to the ‡exible regime) and short-lived, despite the accommodative monetary policy stance. Overall the money supply expansion is instrumental in accommodating the increase in CPI in ‡ation, which in turn brings about the real appreciation necessary for close-to-full private absorption of the aid in ‡ows. In fact, under the …xed regime (without sterilization), the dynamics of private consumption and private investment, as well as that of the trade de…cit, are broadly the same as those under the ‡exible regime.
B. A Fixed Exchange Rate Regime: Sterilize Versus Don' t Sterilize
The results of Figure 1 reveal that, absent sterilization, short-term in ‡ation pressures may arise under a …xed regime. Authorities may …nd this response problematic for two reasons. First, central banks dislike in ‡ation, especially when such in ‡ation re ‡ects aggregate demand pressures. This is indeed the case under a peg and when there is no sterilization, as can be seen in the temporary spike in GDP in the short run. Second, the increase in in ‡ation signals a sizeable real appreciation, and ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution could be interpreted as a loss of competitiveness. Central banks may worry about these developments, especially since it could also be interpreted as a potential threat of the sustainability of the exchange rate regime.
Since these in ‡ationary pressures are associated with the money supply expansion resulting from the foreign reserve accumulation, the central bank may decide to prevent such an expansion through open-market operations, i.e., sterilizing the reserve accumulation. 14 We now proceed to analyze the consequences of full sterilization, which are presented in Figure 2 .
Sterilization policies under the …xed exchange rate regime can certainly reduce the in ‡ationary pressures, but they may also lead to signi…cant private-sector crowding out in the short term and negative e¤ects on real output in the medium term (see solid line with dots in Figure 2 ). With full sterilization, the monetary policy stance becomes considerably tighter-to keep (nominal) reserve money growing at the rate g-with real interest rates increasing by more than before and remaining high for a longer period than in the case of no sterilization. This is e¤ective to contain the in ‡ationary pressures in the short term. Moreover the endogenous reserve accumulation ends up being much larger, as agents no longer have the aid-related liquidity to buy foreign currency as was the case before. The interest rates increase force private consumption and private investment to decline in the short term. And the associated reduction in private sector import demand limits the economy-wide absorption as well as the real exchange rate appreciation. As a result, the trade de…cit does not widen as much as in the case of no sterilization. Furthermore, the reduction in private investment (capital accumulation) has a signi…cant adverse impact on real GDP in the medium term. Hence, full sterilization policies under a …xed regime come at a signi…cant cost in terms of private sector spending and real output. Figure 1 shows that, absent sterilization, the real macroeconomic e¤ects of a …xed regime are very similar to those of a ‡exible regime. But can the real macroeconomic e¤ects of a …xed exchange rate regime with full sterilization be replicated with a ‡exible regime? The answer depends on the role of reserve accumulation in the ‡exible regime. In particular, one can consider regimes where the accumulation of aid in reserves is exogenously determined by the central bank making a ‡exible regime a managed ‡oat. To capture a managed ‡oat regime, we can simulate the model under a ‡exible regime with no aid absorption-i.e., we set ! s = 0 and ! = 0 in (48) so all the aid surge is accumulated in reserves. From a policy perspective, the rationale of considering such experiment lies on the concerns that policy makers have about the signi…cant real appreciation and loss of competitiveness associated with a fully ‡exible exchange rate regime (see Figure 1) . As a result, the central bank may decide to contain some of the real appreciation by limiting the amount of foreign exchange sales to the market and using the aid in ‡ows instead to build up foreign exchange reserves. ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution Figure 3 presents a comparison of the macroeconomic e¤ects between a …xed regime (! s = 5000) and a managed ‡oat regime. In both cases we assume full sterilization, so (nominal) reserve money keeps growing at the rate g. With the managed ‡oat regime, limiting the sale of aid-related foreign exchange (accumulating international reserves) is indeed e¤ective in reducing the appreciation, both in nominal and real terms. As a result, the trade de…cit widens by much less than the increase in aid, which implies no absorption of aid in ‡ows. Given the increase in government spending, partial absorption at an economy-wide level must imply a reduction in private sector demand. This implies a signi…cant private sector consumption and investment crowding out, which takes place in the …rst three to …ve years. Moreover, the reduction in private investment has a signi…cant adverse impact on real GDP, roughly halving the positive GDP e¤ect of scaled-up aid over the …ve-to-ten-year horizon. Hence, in a managed ‡oat, limiting foreign exchange sales may come at a signi…cant real cost.
C. Fixed and Managed Float Regimes: The Role of Sterilization and Reserve Accumulation
Comparing these aid macroeconomic e¤ects of the managed ‡oat regime with those of a …xed regime, under full sterilization, show important similarities particularly regarding the crowding out of the private sector. The crux of the equivalence lies on the following fact: whereas government spending of aid normally corresponds to an externally-…nanced increase in spending, the central bank use of the foreign exchange counterpart of aid to accumulate reserves or to maintain the exchange rate peg (combined with the sterilization policies) transforms this into domestically-…nanced spending. Externally-and domestically-…nanced government spending have very di¤erent impacts on the private sector. In an externally-…nanced case, the foreign exchange in ‡ows are used for …nancing a larger current account and trade de…cits. This allows government spending to increase without crowding out private sector demand. In the case where the foreign counterpart of aid in ‡ows is accumulated in reserves-either as an exogenous outcome as in the managed ‡oat or an endogenous outcome as in the …xed regime-the trade de…cits do not increase as much as in the case of no accumulation. Consequently, higher government spending necessitates a lower private sector demand (crowding out), unless there is a very large supply response.
D. A Fixed Exchange Rate Regime: Closed Versus Open Capital Account
With a …xed exchange rate regime, the positive short-term e¤ects of no sterilization on private consumption and investment depend on the degree of international capital mobility. So far we have assumed that the capital account is fully closed to private capital in ‡ows (or out ‡ows). But once the economy becomes more integrated to international capital markets, a policy of no sterilization under a …xed exchange rate regime can also cause crowding out of the private sector, as shown in Figure 4 . 16 With almost perfect international capital mobility, the domestic nominal interest rate is tied down by an uncovered interest parity condition. While in ‡ation increases on impact, it is expected to decrease, thus resulting in an increase in long-run real interest rates (not shown). This increase is re ‡ected in the spread between domestic and foreign real interest rates. As the spread widens, domestic agents tend to demand more foreign bonds (accumulate net foreign assets) and, in doing so, reduce private consumption and investment. Hence, the private sector crowding out occurs in the short term. And since private capital accumulation falls, medium-term real output is not as high as in the case of On the other hand, and as is well known, with almost perfect international capital mobility, full sterilization policies become less e¤ective in controlling in ‡ation under a …xed regime. With an open capital account, any attempt to raise interest rates as part of the sterilization e¤ort would attract private sector capital in ‡ows. This in turn would add to the foreign reserve buildup and, therefore, to the sterilization need, thereby quickly overwhelming the central bank's ability to control the money supply and in ‡ation, while maintaining a …xed exchange rate.
E. Welfare
Our previous analysis has underscored the role of sterilization policies, in a …xed exchange rate regime, and reserve accumulation policies, in a managed ( ‡exible) regime, in shaping the macroeconomic e¤ects of aid surges. There are interesting trade-o¤s. In a …xed regime, full sterilization of the money supply expansion, resulting from accumulation of international reserves, can contain the associated in ‡ationary pressures but at the cost of crowding out the private sector, including consumption. In a managed regime, full accumulation in reserves of the aid surge (and full sterilization) can contain real exchange rate appreciation pressures, but also at the cost of a¤ecting negatively both private consumption and investment.
Our micro-founded model allows us to calculate the welfare associated with these di¤erent sterilization and reserve accumulation policies and use it as a selection criterion. Following Galí (2008) , we de…ne welfare in this economy as the present value of a second order approximation of the representative household's utility U t around its steady state U ; and expressed it as a fraction of steady-state consumption c. 17 Hence welfare corresponds to
where U t is instantaneous utility in (4) and U c corresponds to the marginal utility of consumption at the steady state.
To make the welfare analysis more exhaustive, we consider a continuum of sterilization policies that correspond to a convex combination of the two cases analyzed above-full sterilization and no sterilization. We can index these policies with the sterilization parameter 2 [0; 1] to describe general open-market operations as
Note that since our model is non-stochastic, the spirit of our analysis di¤ers from that of the recent optimal policy analysis of the new-Keynesian literature. This literature studies optimal …scal and monetary policies in the context of stochastic models in which the volatility of the shocks plays a crucial role (see for instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007, among others). Here we abtract from these issues that are investigated in a similar setup in Moldovan et al. (2014) .
©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution Then when = 0, we recover (51), which corresponds to the case of no sterilization. On the other hand, if = 1 we obtain (50) re ‡ecting full sterilization. Similarly, under a ‡exible exchange rate regime, it is possible to calculate the welfare associated with a continuum of reserve accumulation policies ! s 2 [0; 1] with ! s = 0 (no reserve accumulation) and ! s = 1 (full accumulation), as the extreme cases.
The left-hand side of Figure 5 presents the results of this welfare analysis for a …xed regime for di¤erent sterilization policies. It shows that no sterilization appears to be a dominant policy: for the given calibration, the welfare associated with no sterilization ( = 0) is much greater than that of full sterilization ( = 1). This is not surprising, since our previous impulse response analysis revealed the signi…cant private consumption crowding out under full sterilization. However, note that although welfare is maximized in the absence of sterilization, there seems to be a threshold for the sterilization parameter ( 0:8) beyond which welfare signi…cantly declines: That, is beyond that threshold, sterilization policies become e¤ective in controlling the growth rate of reserve money, but at the cost of generating much higher real interest rates and, therefore, signi…cant reductions in private consumption, especially in the …rst years. Moreover, since households no longer have the aid-related money liquidity to buy foreign currency, the endogenous reserve accumulation ends up being much larger than for policies below that threshold. This further restricts the consumption for traded goods and contributes to the decline of aggregate consumption.
The right-hand side of Figure 5 shows the welfare analysis for a ‡exible regime for di¤erent reserve accumulation policies, which we refer to as a managed ‡oat regime. 18 Welfare is maximized under no reserve accumulation (! = 1)-i.e., the case of a fully ‡exible exchange rate regime-which clearly dominates the other policies, including full reserve accumulation (! = 0). As before, this is just a consequence of the fact that not absorbing aid (accumulating reserves) may have a negative e¤ect on private consumption, especially in the short to medium run. In other words, with full absorption (no reserve accumulation), the positive impact of aid on consumption is maximized.
The welfare analysis also con…rms the equivalence between a …xed exchange rate regime and a managed ‡oat, along the dimensions of sterilization and reserve accumulation policies. As explained above, the equivalence should be clear in the extreme cases of (i) full sterilization for a …xed and (ii) full reserve accumulation and sterilization for a ‡oat. In other words, a managed ‡oat regime should behave as a …xed regime, insofar as in these cases both regimes involve accumulating reserves and full sterilization. The main di¤erence is that in our model the managed ‡oat regime involves accumulating aid in reserves as an exogenous policy by the central bank, while in the …xed regime it is an endogenous decision driven by a nominal exchange rate target. Perhaps more surprising is the equivalence between the a fully ‡exible regime and the …xed regime with no sterilization. The real macroeconomic e¤ects are very similar, which explains the equivalence of the welfare results, but the transmission mechanism is di¤erent. In the ‡exible regime, the real appreciation associated with aid is driven by the nominal exchange rate appreciation, while in the …xed regime, it is caused by in ‡ation.
F. Discussion
The previous results have yielded a number of insights that merit further discussion. The …rst insight, which is known in academic circles but is sometimes overlooked in the policy debate is that, under a peg, movements in in ‡ation become an essential component of macroeconomic adjustment. In the case of an aid surge, allowing the aid to …nance much needed imports (including to help implement welcome increases in private investment) requires an equilibrium real appreciation, and in ‡ation is the ‡ip side of such an outcome. In addition, in the presence of nominal rigidities, the increase in in ‡ation is distortionary because it must be accompanied by an arti…cial expansion of the economy which would not have taken place if prices were fully ‡exible. This adds to the drama of the aid surge, because it would indicate that the economy is overheating, and that something must be done about it, while the opposite is true. More generally, the "real" nature of in ‡ationary movements can be di¢ cult to acknowledge by the central bank, because it runs counter to the consensus view on the role of such institutions in modern economies, which is to ensure stable in ‡ation and keep aggregate demand pressures in check. Understanding the nature of in ‡ation in these regimes is therefore essential to allow the aid to ful…ll its role.
The second insight is that important challenges emerge when the central bank, out of concern for in ‡ationary pressures or the potential loss of competitiveness, sterilizes any endogenous accumulation of reserves, in a …xed regime, or any exogenous accumulation of reserves, in a ‡exible (managed) regime. While it succeeds in curbing in ‡ation or containing real appreciation pressures, it is at the sizeable real cost of a fall in private investment and private consumption. With a …xed regime, these large real e¤ects may arise in part from the inability to recognize the increase in in ‡ation for what it is. More generally they re ‡ect the fact that by curbing the in ‡ationary pressure, the central bank is e¤ectively undoing the aid surge to the point where the aid ends parked in an account in New York or London (as part of the central bank's reserve holdings) rather than …nancing much needed local projects. In this case the …scal expansion that follows the increase in aid is domestically as opposed to externally …nanced. This insight underscores the crucial importance of the central bank in e¤ectively determining the impact of the aid surge.
A third and related insight is that sterilization policies in pegs have real e¤ects that go beyond the presence of nominal rigidities. Because these policies can in ‡uence the actual accumulation of reserves, they a¤ect real outcomes over the medium term, ranging from movements in private consumption and investment to movements in the real exchange rate. Just like for the case of movements in in ‡ation, the real nature of sterilization in pegs is fundamentally di¤erent from the view of open market operations in closed economies or open economies with ‡exible exchange rates. The latter have a real e¤ect only to the extent that nominal rigidities are present, which implies that the e¤ects of monetary policy die out after a few quarters. 19 Whenever possible, we have stressed the term "central bank policy" as opposed to "monetary policy" to emphasize the real nature of these decisions. In our view, this "realness" adds some nuance to the concept of central bank independence, because in this particular case such independence can result in suboptimal policies.
We now discuss some important caveats. In our model simulations, it was preferable to fully absorb the aid. But there are cases where some accumulation of aid in reserves may be desirable. With managed ‡oats, Berg et al. (2010b) show that under pessimistic assumptions-i.e., public investment is very ine¢ cient and there are large learning-by-doing externalities in the traded sector capturing Dutch disease e¤ects-accumulating some of the aid in reserves may be welfare enhancing. 20 Simulations under a …xed exchange rate regime but with the same pessimistic assumptions yield the same results about the desirability of reserve accumulation (not shown). A second caveat is that in our model we abstract from other policy instruments-e.g., direct price controls or export subsidiesthat may also help o¤set in ‡ation and real appreciation pressures, beyond sterilization and reserve accumulation policies. Furthermore from the government and central bank perspective, there are other important considerations when deciding for fully sterilizing aid surges, such as the desirability of facing dramatically higher interest rates in thin money markets while dealing with large stock of short-term domestic debt. 21 Finally, our welfare analysis has not considered the implications of macroeconomic volatility which may a¤ect the comparison and equivalences between …xed and ‡exible exchange rate 1 9 See Evans (1999, 2005) for empirical evidence on, and theoretical foundations of, these assertions.
2 0 Berg et al (2010b) show that much of the challenge comes from trying to spend the aid in the …rst place. In this case, it is better to limit the amount of spending so that government savings coincide with the accumulation of reserves. This avoids having to crowd out the private sector in order to limit the negative e¤ect on productivity. 2 1 Our model generates a signi…cant increase in real interest rates under full sterilization. However, the increase in real interest rates would be even more dramatic if the model included hand-to-mouth consumers, which lower the aggregate interest-elasticity of the demand for bonds and can help mimic market thinness. This type of consumer is analyzed in Berg et al (2010a Berg et al ( , 2010b , and we do not include them in this model for simplicity.
regimes.
V. Conclusions
We have shown how, under limited capital mobility, the combination of di¤erent exchange rate regimes with sterilization and reserve accumulation policies by the central bank, in response to an aid surge, actually shapes the macroeconomic e¤ects of aid in a fundamental way. We have discussed the trade-o¤s and welfare consequences of these policies highlighting some similarities, in terms of real macroconomic e¤ects, between …xed exchange rate regimes and ‡exible regimes (managed ‡oats).
Results from the paper raise various questions that have not been covered here. The importance of equilibrium movements in in ‡ation suggests that the optimal design of policy, in countries that have …xed exchange rate regimes but limited capital mobility (and thus some degree of monetary policy autonomy), may lead to a radical departure from the consensus view on optimal monetary policy that is found in the traditional new-Keynesian literature. 22 This is because the objective of stabilizing aggregate demand needs to be measured against the need for equilibrium movements in the real exchange rate. Second, downward nominal rigidities, e.g., in wages, may qualify some of our …ndings about the desirability of sizeable but temporary real appreciations, because such appreciations could end up threatening the sustainability of the peg. We leave these questions for future work. both domestic and foreign asset markets, with participation in the latter subject to portfolio adjustment costs. These costs capture the degree of international capital mobility, and their calibration allows to study a range of options, from de facto closed to a fully open capital account.
We separate policy decisions: the central bank is in charge of exchange rate and monetary policy (including international reserves accumulation and open-market operations), while the …scal authority, which is the direct recipient of aid, decides how much of this aid to spend. All quantity variables except labor are de-trended by the labor productivity level T t ; which grows at a constant factor n-the exogenous long-run gross growth rate of the economy, so that T t = nT t 1 :
We assume that the law of one price holds for the traded good. Therefore P T t = S t P T t ; where P T t is the price of traded goods, S t corresponds to the nominal exchange rate, and P T t is the foreign price of traded goods. By denoting the domestic (foreign) Consumer Price Index (CPI) as P t (P t ), we can express the CPI-based real exchange rate as s t = StP t Pt and the relative price of non-traded goods as
We also de…ne real gross domestic product (GDP) as:
i.e., the sum of the production of the non-traded good, y N t , and the traded good, y T t , valued at their steady-state relative prices p N and s.
We proceed to lay out the model in stages, starting with the speci…cation of price-setting and production decisions.
A.1. Firms
The Non-Traded Good Sector: Firms in the non-traded sector face monopolistic competition and sticky prices. Each monopolist produces a variety i of the non-traded good. The monopolist is subject to a demand constraint of the Dixit-Stiglitz type:
where y N t is the overall demand for the good and p N it is the price (relative to the CPI index) set for variety i. As in Rotemberg (1982) , the monopolist faces price adjustment costs, but we also allow for indexation to past values of in ‡ation. These costs are given by G it where N t is the non-traded goods in ‡ation with the steady-state value represented by N .
Production is given by
where z N is a constant productivity parameter; l N it is the amount of labor employed, k N it 1 is private capital, which is …rm-speci…c, and q t 1 is public capital. The coe¢ cient indicates the production ©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution share of labor, while denotes the share of private capital in total capital used in production. Private capital is accumulated via investment x N it as described by
where x N it is a composite good, is the depreciation rate, and F N it 2
The maximization problem of the monopolist corresponds to choosing the price level p N it , the amount of labor l N it , capital k N it 1 , and investment x N it to maximize the discounted pro…ts
subject to equations (16)- (18), where the price adjustment costs
Note that there is a tax distortion $ that reduces the value of …rms'sales net of price adjustment costs for any given level of production. This distortion is o¤set in the aggregate, as the amount
is rebated to each …rm, but it a¤ects …rms' incentives to hire labor and invest in new capital. The distortion is meant to capture a broad set of institutional features that keep poor countries from investing at the high rates that might otherwise be justi…ed by the very low stocks of private capital. In this way, we match the observed low investment shares in low-income countries.
In a symmetric equilibrium (dropping the sub-indices), the …rst order conditions of the representative monopolist in the non-traded sector are equations (16)-(17) and:
and
where is the consumers'subjective discount factor, N t is related to Tobin's Q; and N
The Traded Good Sector: The traded sector features perfect competition and ‡exible prices. The representative …rm i is endowed with a similar technology to that of the non-traded sector:
and also accumulates capital k T it following nk
where x T it is investment and F T it 2
The …rm picks the amount of capital k T it , labor l T it and investment x T it in order to maximize the discounted pro…ts 1
A.2. Households
Consumers must decide how to allocate consumption expenditures among di¤erent goods. Consumption of the traded good and the non-traded good, denoted by c T t and c N t , respectively, are combined into a CES basket 
with the associated CPI P t = ; with measuring the elasticity of substitution of these varieties.
The demand for variety i is given by: 
where m t are the holdings of real money balances and l t is the amount of labor supplied to …rms. The parameter 2 (0; 1) corresponds to the subjective discount factor, # 2 (0; 1) is the share of consumption in the utility u(:); > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between c t and m t , { is a scale parameter, and > 0 is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
Labor mobility is limited across sectors and intersectoral wage di¤erentials are possible. Supplied labor is de…ned as in Bouakez et al. (2009) :
A.4. The Central Bank
We want to study the implications of di¤erent exchange rate regimes for the macroeconomic e¤ects of aid surges. We will …rst consider the case of a ‡exible exchange rate regime and use it as a benchmark to understand the e¤ects of having a …xed regime. Then, under a …xed regime, we will analyze the consequences of di¤erent sterilization policies.
; depend on open-market operations, b cb t b cb t n t ; and changes in international reserves, s t R t R t 1 n :
Reserve Accumulation Policies: We capture di¤erent speci…cations of exchange regimes ( ‡exible versus …xed) by assuming that the central bank implements the following rule for the accumulation of international reserves:
where S t is the nominal depreciation of the currency, and R and S are the steady-state levels (targets) of reserves and nominal depreciation. The parameter ! s 0 measures the degree of commitment to a nominal depreciation target. For ! s = 0; the rule replicates a ‡exible exchange rate regime, while for ! s >> 0; the rule captures a …xed regime. Under a ‡exible exchange rate regime, the central bank can still accumulate reserves in response to changes in the volume of aid. In this case the regime becomes a managed ‡oat. The coe¢ cient ! 2 [0; 1] measures the fraction of additional aid dollars sold on the market to the private sector by the central bank, i.e., the degree of absorption of aid by the private sector. Under a …xed regime, on the other hand, reserves accumulation is driven by the central bank's commitment to hitting the targeted nominal depreciation S . 30 This, of course, implies that aid absorption by the private sector, under a …xed regime, becomes endogenously determined, as we discuss below.
Monetary and Sterilization Policies: We allow for two alternative money growth rules: either full or zero sterilization. To model full sterilization, we assume that open-market operations (changes in b cb t ) adjust such that nominal reserve money always grows at the rate g-i.e., that 31 m t = g m t 1 n t :
This captures in general the fact that many low-income countries still target money, at least de jure. More speci…cally, full sterilization requires that open-market operations follow:
A.5. The Good Market Equilibrium Conditions
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium, so we can drop the sub-indices that distinguish among …rms in the non-traded productive sector. Here we state explicitly the market clearing conditions for nontraded and traded goods, but bear in mind that similar equilibrium conditions hold for bonds, labor, and money, respectively.
The equilibrium in the non-traded goods market is described by:
where D N t = ' c t + x N t + x T t + G t + (p g t ) g t ; while the market-clearing condition for traded goods can be derived by combining the equilibrium condition (52) and the budget constraints for all agents, including consumers, the government, and the central bank. Then Equation (53) makes clear the possible uses of aid: it can …nance a higher current account de…cit net of aid (CAD), a capital account surplus (KAS), or an accumulation of reserves (RA).
Finally, by the de…nitions of the CPI, the government price index, the nominal depreciation rate, and the in ‡ation of non-traded goods we have 
